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"COLLATERAL DAMAGE": NO RE-ENTRY FOR DRUG OFFENDERS
NoRA V. DEMLEITNER*
S INCE the events of September 11, 2001, much of the public debate has
centered on the so-called "war on terrorism." In the meantime, the
war on drugs has receded further into the background despite some con-
nections between the two.' However, that "war" has not ended, and its
damage remains palpable.
While the large-scale imprisonment of drug offenders is being widely
discussed,2 less well-known are the so-called "collateral consequences" that
frequently follow automatically from a drug conviction.3 They hinder in-
dividual offenders' rehabilitation and reintegration into society by restrict-
ing welfare benefits, employment and skills training opportunities, and
the re-union with family. For non-U.S. citizens, a drug conviction usually
means deportation and a decades-long ban on re-entry. While "collateral
restrictions" that are closely tied to the risk an individual offender poses
* Visiting Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law; Professor of
Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. Bates College, B.A., 1989; Yale Law
School, J.D., 1992; Georgetown University Law Center, LL.M., 1994. The author
wishes to thank Eric Blumenson, Robert Johnson, Debbie Mukamal, Eva Nilsen,
Michael Smith, Jeremy Travis, the members of the ABA Task Force on Collateral
Sanctions, the participants in the Villanova Law Review Symposium "New Voices on
the War on Drugs," and especially Matthew Rowland for their valuable input and
suggestions. Special thanks go to the organizers of the Law Review Symposium,
and to my research assistant Antonetta Stancu (Hofstra Class 2003).
1. For a linkage of the two "wars," see Tim Golden, The World: A War on Terror
Meets a War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, §4, at 4 (describing Osama Bin
Laden's alleged connection to "super-heroin" and funding of rebels in Colombia
through sale of narcotics); Barry Meier, "Super" Heroin Was Planned by bin Laden,
Reports Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2001, at B3. Since late January 2002, government
sponsored television spots and newspaper ads have further highlighted the linkage
between the two. Drug users have been portrayed as funding terrorism, largely in
Colombia.
2. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Legislating Federal Crime
and Its Consequences: Toward a Principled Basis for Federal Criminal Legislation, 543
ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 15, 18 (1996) (discussing disproportionate
imprisonment for drug crimes, accounting for 42% of prison population). For the
first time since 1972, the number of people in state prison fell, albeit so slightly, in
2000. The drop has been particularly pronounced in California which mandates
the diversion of drug offenders into treatment programs instead of incarceration.
SeeJenifer Warren, Prison Becomes a Harder Sell, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, § 2, at 1.
3. This Article uses the terms "collateral consequences" and "collateral sanc-
tions" interchangeably. While the former is the more established word, indicating
the civil character of such sanctions, increasingly the latter is being used to con-
note the seriousness of such consequences. See ABA Task Force on Collateral
Sanctions, Proposed ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (Third Edition), Chapter
19: Collateral Sanctions and Administrative Disqualification of Convicted Persons
(Mar. 7, 2002) (on file with author) (using phrase "collateral sanctions" and argu-
ing for making such "consequences" part of criminal sentencing process).
(1027)
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may be defensible, many of those currently imposed are not justifiable on
punishment grounds. Rather, they violate the social compact and access
to democratic participation. Most importantly, common sense indicates
that depriving individuals access to legitimate means of survival contrib-
utes to higher rates of recidivism.
Because most of these collateral sanctions do not fulfill any purpose,
and often are counter-productive, this Article calls for their abolition and
for increased assistance to drug offenders upon release from imprison-
ment. The model for post-sentence assistance should be the "Marshall
Plan." That plan assisted post-war Germany economically by providing di-
rect benefits and the ability to become self-sufficient. To bind Germany
into a Western alliance with the dual goals of preventing its re-militariza-
tion and enabling it to withstand the threat of Communism, the Marshall
Plan combined economic aid with direct oversight of German economic
and political development. Today the enemy is no longer Communism
but future crime with its attendant consequences. Ex-offenders with pros-
pects for personal and economic reintegration and a stake in the future of
their families and their communities will withstand the temptation of
crime more easily than those cut loose.
Part I discusses the concept of "war" in light of the "wars" on terror-
ism and drugs.4 It highlights the damage that such wars inflict on the
population. Part II details the collateral consequences that befall drug
offenders and inhibit their reintegration potential. 5 The Article then
turns to the societal consequences of such additional and often perma-
nent sanctions. 6 The final section focuses on the Marshall Plan. 7 It sets
out the plan as it was conceived after World War II, and then translates the
concept to the "war" on drugs.
I. THE WAR METAPHOR
Because of the high profile of the "war on terrorism," much of its
impact and many of its ambiguities have been the subject of public de-
bate.8 However, many of the questions it raises are identical to those im-
plicit-but never resolved-questions regarding the war on drugs.
The war on terrorism has made us question the "war" metaphor in
ways we have not since the Vietnam War. The term "war" seems inexora-
bly bound up with World War II, the "war" par excellence. It pitted against
4. See infra notes 8-40 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 41-139 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 147-68 and accompanying text.
8. See e.g., Linda Greenhouse, War Zone: What Price Liberty , N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2001, § 4, at 1; Is Ethnic Profiling Ever Part of Good Policing As America Fights ?, ABC
NEWS: NIGHTLINE, Oct. 1, 2001; Popular Support for New Government Investigative Mea-
sures But Questions Remain, CNN: GREENFIELD AT LARGE, Nov. 28, 2001; Serge
Schmemann, Unsure Ground for Fight Against Atrocity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at
B1 (debating war on terrorism).
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each other two sets of powers, both of which consisted of states with spe-
cific territories and populations, that fought an open and declared war.
The objective was total defeat of the other side. It was just as clear a goal
as were the means used to fight this war: armed forces at sea, in the air and
on land.
No armed conflict since World War II has fit this description of what
we consider a traditional war as clearly.9 However, the "wars" on drugs
and terrorism appear the most amorphous and ambiguous of all: What
does it mean to make "war" on terrorists or the so-called "drug lords"?
How are the "enemies" defined? Where do we find them? What does it
mean to win, or lose, such a "war"?10 Equally important, when do we know
that we have won, or lost-absent some cataclysmic event? How should a
state deal with the "supporters" of terrorists or "drug lords"? What forms
can such "support" take? How much of the so-called "collateral damage,"
presumably the suffering, and deaths of innocent civilians, is acceptable in
these "wars"?
Since shortly after September 11, 2001, these questions have been de-
bated, at least in some fora.11 However, we have never faced such an open
policy debate-either in Congress or within the public-regarding the so-
called war on drugs.
Some have postulated that the war on drugs is won once there are no
more drugs in the United States, a goal of total abstinence, akin to the
stated aims of (alcohol) Prohibition. 12 Others view a more limited-and
realistic-objective as useful, such as a decrease in the number of drug
addicts or first-time users. 13 The focus on the objectives of the "war" has
often been replaced by discussions about its consequences. Some have
argued that the "war" aspect of the fight against drugs applies only outside
the United States, largely in Latin America where the U.S. government has
9. In terms of warfare, World War II became the first unconventional (i.e.,
nuclear) war, as distinguished from the wars preceding (and following) it, in which
exclusively conventional weapons were used. However, the war was "conventional"
in the sense that it met all the elements of the traditional definition of "war."
10. For multiple declarations of "wars" and victories over drugs, see ARNOLD
S. TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR 150 (1987).
11. See Deborah Barfield, America's Ordeal, NEWSDAY, Oct. 2, 2001, at A4 (dis-
cussing curtailment of civil rights in fight against terrorism); Craig Gordon &
Timothy M. Phelps, Military Tribunal Plan Detailed, NEWSDAY, Mar. 21, 2002, at A18
(setting out rules for military tribunals in which alleged terrorists may be tried and
assessing usefulness of interviews of Middle Eastern men in the United States as
law-enforcement tool); Schmemann, supra note 8, at BI (debating humanitarian
tactics of United States in war on terrorism).
12. SeeJuan R. Torruella, Commentary: One Judge's Attempt At a Rational Discus-
sion of the So Called War on Drugs, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1996) (discussing
similarities between some proponents' position of harsh drug laws and
Prohibition).
13. See Louis Kraar, How to Win the War on Drugs, in DRUGS IN AMERICA, 37, 38-
42 (Robert Emmet Long ed., 1993) (suggesting treatment and prevention meth-
ods to aid in drug war).
2002] 1029
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used its armed forces to destroy coca production. 14 Others would counter
that the war on drugs has turned into a "war" on minorities, especially
African-Americans, at home. 15
In many respects the war on terrorism has come to track the war on
drugs. It is being fought domestically and abroad; it has led to the curtail-
ment of civil liberties; its goals are equally amorphous and ambiguous. We
can also be assured that its victims will be manifold and its consequences
will continue for decades.
Undoubtedly the battlefields of the drug war have been at home as
much as abroad. 16 In many respects the "war" has come to resemble a civil
war. It pits citizen against citizen, family member against family member,
community against community. Often this has meant that it also pits one
racial group against another.1 7 People in this country, as well as abroad,
have become casualties of the war on drugs.
While much of the official debate centers on the large "drug lords,"
many small dealers and even drug users have been declared enemies. The
treatment of drug users has, however, been contradictory. While they
have been-maybe akin to a drafted soldier in a foreign army-viewed as
weak individuals, they are the underlying reason for the "war." After all, it
is demand for illegal drugs in North America and Europe that fuels most
of the supply.' 8 For that reason, the view dominates that at least some
punishment must be inflicted even on the drug user.19 In a civil war the
14. SeeJames Risen & Christopher Marquis, Officials Long Debated Risk of Anti-
Drug Patrol in Peru, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2001, at Al (describing recent history of
United States activities in using military force to stave off drug flow from Latin
American countries).
15. See Lewis H. Lapham, A Political Opiate, in DRUGS IN AMERICA, supra note
13, at 50, 55 (arguing that war on drugs is really class war).
16. See, e.g., also Eric E. Sterling, Friendly Fire: Rethinking the War on Drugs from a
Quaker Perspective, HARv. ALUM. MAC., Spring 2000, at 2 (on file with author).
17. See, e.g., Note, Winning the War on Drugs: A "Second Chance" for Nonviolent
Drug Offenders, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1485, 1489 (2000) (detailing racial mispercep-
tions about users of illegal drugs); Lapham, supra note 15, at 54-55 (arguing that
war on drugs is racially charged). A specific example of the racial overtones of the
wars on drugs and on terrorism is "racial profiling." See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson,
U.S. Border Enforcement: Drugs, Migrants, and the Rule of Law, 47 VILL. L. REV. 897,
899-906 (2002) (discussing "racial profiling"); Robert V. Ward Jr., As You Were Say-
ing ... Racial Profiling Not the Answer to Fight Terrorism in America, BOSTON HERALD,
Oct. 14, 2001, at 22 (arguing against blanket racial and ethnic profiling in wake of
September 11, 2001).
18. For a discussion of the situation in some of the source countries, see gen-
erally Melvin Burke, Bolivia: The Politics of Cocaine, in DRUGS IN AMERICA, supra note
13, at 84; Ruth Conniff, Colombia's Dirty War, Washington's Dirty Hands, in DRUGS IN
AMERICA, supra note 13, at 68; Robin Kirk, Sowing Violence in Peru, in DRUGS IN
AMERICA, supra note 13, at 92; Elaine Shannon, New Kings of Coke, in DRUGS IN
AMERICA, supra note 13, at 60.
19. See STEVEN WISOTSKY, BREAUNG THE IMPASSE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 32-33
(1986) (discussing relatively light sanctions imposed on drug users).
1030 (Vol. 47: p. 1027
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drug user becomes at least a collaborator, if not a traitor. per se.20 This
strategy of targeting the drug user became more pronounced when it be-
came obvious that focusing solely on the supply side was doomed to
failure. 21
A "war" requires that enemies be imprisoned once captured. In the
war on drugs this has meant large-scale imprisonment. Well over one mil-
lion individuals-imagine the population of the State of Rhode Island-
are in prison. In 1999, approximately 251,000 of the almost 1.2 million
state prisoners, 22 and approximately 68,000 of the almost 119,000 federal
prisoners, 23 sentenced to more than one year in prison had drug convic-
tions. The offenders spend a large number of years behind bars.
The number of imprisoned women who are convicted of drug of-
fenses is higher than ever.24 Female drug offenders constitute approxi-
mately one-third of all female state offenders incarcerated for more than
one year.25 The rising number of women in prisons is particularly distres-
sing since many of them are mothers whose absence has a profound im-
pact on their children.26
Equally disconcerting is the disproportionate imprisonment of Afri-
can- Americans. 27 Almost 7% of African-American men were imprisoned
20. See KATHERINE BECKETTr, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPO-
RARY AMERICAN POLITICS 72-73 (1997) (noting that drug problem comes in differ-
ent packages with some portraying drug users as victims while others portray users
as criminals).
21. See A. Morgan Cloud, III, Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction: A Study of the
Possible Convergence of Rational Theory and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 725, 729-
30 (1989) (describing goals of legislation to reduce demand for drugs using "de-
mand reduction strategies").
22. SeeALLENJ. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS
IN 2000, 11 tbl.16 (2001) (relating criminal statistics by offense category).
23. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center,
Query the Federal Justice Statistics Database (reporting drug conviction data for popu-
lation of offenders in federal prison at end of 1999), available at http://
fjsrc.urban.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2002).
24. See BECK & HARRISON, supra note 22, at 12 (noting that drug offenders
accounted for largest source of total growth among female inmates-35%).
25. See id. at 11 (relating criminal statistics on female drug offenders).
26. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, WOMEN OFFENDERS 7 (1999) (noting that 70% of women under correctional
sanctions are mothers, averaging two children);JEREMY TRAviS ET AL., FROM PRISON
TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 13 (2001)
(reporting number of incarcerated woman who have children), available at http://
www.urban.org/pdfs/from-prison to-home.pdf.
27. See BECK & HARRISON, supra note 22, at 11 tbl. 16 (noting that of state
inmates in 2000, almost three times as many African-Americans (144,700) as whites
(50,700) served more than one year in prison for drug offenses); see also Note,
Winning the War, supra note 17, at 1485-86 (in 1992, African-Americans accounted
for 74% of all those sentenced for drug offenses even though only 14% of illegal
drug users were African-American).
2002] 1031
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by the mid-1990s. 28 However, imprisonment is not the sole consequence
of drug convictions.
"Punishment" for many drug offenders continues once they are re-
leased from prison. 29 They are usually subject to so-called "collateral con-
sequences." Many of these are virtually unknown outside the criminal
justice community, 30 and of some consequences, even judges, prosecutors
and criminal defense attorneys are unaware. 3 ' Federal legislation creating
collateral consequences for drug offenses is frequently not part of crime
legislation;3 2 it passes into law without being debated in relevant congres-
sional committees, including the judiciary committee. 33
The so-called "collateral consequences" are legally classified as civil
rather than criminal sanctions. 34 For that reason they can be imposed
without the protections and guarantees of the criminal justice system.
This is particularly troubling since many of these "consequences" deny
drug offenders fundamental social, economic and political rights. They
impact the lives of ex-offenders dramatically and often also deprive their
families of crucial governmental support. 35
Collateral consequences are justified either on punitive, deterrent or
preventive grounds. 36 The last rationale applies less to drug offenders be-
cause most collateral consequences imposed on them are not based on a
28. See Gary LaFree et al., The Changing Nature of Crime in America, in I CRIMI-
NAL JUsTICE 1, 25 (Gary LaFree et al. eds., 2000) (describing alarming rise in rate
of African- Americans incarcerated for drug convictions).
29. For the debate whether collateral consequences constitute "punishment,"
see, for example, G. Scott Rafshoon, Comment, Community Notification of Sex Offend-
ers: Issues of Punishment, Privacy, and Due Process, 44 EMORY L.J. 1633, 1654-67 (1995)
(arguing that collateral consequences and "civil disabilities" are additional forms
of punishment).
30. See TRAvIS ET AL., supra note 26, at 25-26 (describing several forms of col-
lateral consequences suffered by ex-convicts attempting to re-enter society).
31. See Interview with Robert M.A. Johnson, District Attorney, Anoka County,
Minnesota; President, National District Attorneys Association (Sept. 30, 2001)
[hereinafter Interview with Robert M.A. Johnson].
32. See generallyJeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclu-
sion, in COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE SOCIAL COST OF MASS INCARCERATION (M. Ches-
ney-Lind & Marc Mauer eds., forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 3, on file with
author); infra notes 41-131 and accompanying text.
33. See TRAvis ET AL., supra note 26, at 25-36.
34. See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 154-55 (1999) (civil
sanctions are not considered punishment because many are administrative in
nature).
35. See infra notes 109-25 and accompanying text (discussing collateral conse-
quences that impact family life).
36. See Demleitner, supra note 34, at 160-61 (arguing for coherent framework
for collateral consequences based on penological goals); Andrew von Hirsch, Crim-
inology: Commensurability and Crime Prevention: Evaluating Formal Sentencing Structures
and Their Rationale, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 209, 210-11 (1983) (suggesting
general principles for evaluating formal sentencing structure).
[Vol. 47: p. 10271032
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risk model.3 7 On the other hand, punitive and deterrent grounds have
played a dominant role in the congressional discourse surrounding drug
offenders. The denial of governmental benefits to drug offenders has
been justified as a measure of "user accountability." 38 Drug users, often
considered to have made a rational choice, should be held accountable
and will be held out as an example.
Given that nearly 600,000 prison inmates have been released annually
in the past few years,3 9 collateral consequences impact a large number of
individuals, many of whom are drug offenders. The panoply of collateral
sanctions impacting drug offenders makes it virtually impossible for them
to re-enter society successfully. Secondary sanctions marginalize ex-of-
fenders for many years after their maximum sentence has expired, and in
some cases for life. They inflict substantial "collateral damage" not only
on drug offenders but also on their families and communities since they
hamper re-entry and reintegration.
40
II. DRUG OFFENDERS MEET COLLATERAL SANCTIONS
Collateral sanctions befall all types of offenders. 4 1 Although the pub-
lic considers murder, rape and kidnapping more serious offenses than
drug possession or distribution, the collateral consequences imposed on
drug offenders tend to be more severe than those imposed on murderers,
rapists and kidnappers. Drug offenders suffer from them disproportion-
ately because many collateral consequences target them specifically. Next
to sex offenders, 4 2 drug felons and drug misdemeanants have borne the
37. See BECKETr, supra note 20, at 72-73 (discussing rise of risk as concept in
criminal justice).
38. See BECKETr, supra note 20, at 73 (noting that user accountability has be-
come catchphrase in war on drugs). "User accountability" implies that "[u]sers
pay the price if they break the law." Id.
39. SeeJoan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to the Community: Political, Economic
and Social Consequences, in SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CEN-
TURY 1, 1 (U.S. Dep't of Justice ed., Nov. 2000), available at www.ncjrs.org.
40. The discussion of "collateral consequences" in this Article focuses on
those secondary sanctions arising from convictions for the use, possession or sale
of illegal narcotics and related offenses of conspiracy or attempt. Many non-of-
fense specific collateral sanctions also impact drug offenders. In addition, the gen-
eral discussion pertaining to successful re-entry and the limitations on drug
treatment applies to offenders who committed property, violent or public order
offenses under the influence of illegal narcotics or to feed a drug habit. For a
discussion of the number of inmates involved with illegal drugs, see Steven
Belenko, The Challenges of Integrating Drug Treatment into the Criminal Justice Process,
63 ALBANw L. REv. 833, 873 tbl.1 (2000).
41. See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 34, at 154 (describing collateral sanctions
for various offenses).
42. Among the best known collateral consequences applicable to sex offend-
ers are registration and notification requirements. For examples of the federal
statutes that require states to institute such provisions, see Megan's Law, Pub. L.
No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (sex offender notification statute); Act of Oct.
1996, Pub. L. 104-236, 110 Stat. 3096 (sex offender notification statute);Jacob Wet-
terling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Act,
2002] 1033
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brunt of civil sanctions. Within the last fifteen years, the panoply of civil
sanctions applicable to them has increased dramatically. 43
The civil sanctions most devastating to offenders are those that de-
prive them of the ability to reintegrate successfully. Re-entry and rehabili-
tation assistance are particularly crucial to offenders with two sets of
characteristics, which may overlap. First, those who have served long
prison terms need substantial reintegration assistance. They have lost the
ability to operate as individual agents in a less structured environment,
and often have difficulty adjusting to a society and job market very differ-
ent than the ones in existence when they went to prison. Because of the
long sentences imposed on drug traffickers, especially in the federal sys-
tem, many of them fall into this category. Second, offenders who suffer
from insufficient education and job training will become likely recidivists
unless they receive reintegration assistance. 44 However, it is precisely
these offenders that are frequently excluded from the social safety net and
from access to training and education because of collateral sanctions.
A. Denial of Access to the Social Net
Federal law allows for the denial of a whole set of federal benefits to
drug offenders. 45 The Denial of Federal Benefits Program of 1988 em-
powers federal and state courts to prohibit drug offenders from accessing
a broad range of benefits, excluding food stamps and other survival-type
subsidies.46 A first drug trafficking conviction can lead to the denial of
benefits for up to five years; a second conviction doubles the maximum
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994))
(sex offender registration statute).
43. See Demleitner, supra note 34, at 155 (describing increase in collateral
sanctions in mid-1980s to mid-1990s due to "'get tough' approach to crime").
44. See Note, Winning the War, supra note 17, at 1491 (noting that recidivism
rates for drug offenders remain high and are estimated to range from 65% to
80%).
In recent years the number of those admitted to prison for parole violations
or the commission of new offenses while on parole has risen to more than one-
third of all prison admissions. See TRAvIs ET AL., supra note 26, at 5. Of federal
inmates released between 1992 and 1994, the proportion of those returning to
federal prisons within three years increased from 18.2% to 18.6%. See WILLIAM J.
SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFENDERS RETURNING TO FEDERAL PRISON,
1986-97, at 1 (2000).
45. See SUSAN M. KUZMA, FEDERAL STATUTES IMPOSING COLLATERAL CONSE-
QUENCES UPON CONVICTION 10-11 (2000) (outlining federal benefits that may be
revoked or limited upon conviction).
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2002) (providing for ineligibility of drug traffickers
and possessors). For an exemplary list of federal benefit denial programs, see Rob-
ert W. Musser, Jr., Denial of Federal Benefits to Drug Traffickers and Drug Possessors: A
Broad-Reaching But Seldom Used Sanction, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 252, 253 (2000).
1034 [Vol. 47: p. 1027
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possible ineligibility period;4 7 a third conviction mandates the court bar
such benefits permanently.
4 8
Denial of survival-type welfare benefits takes collateral sanctions a step
further by making critical assistance, particularly necessary after release,
inaccessible. 49 Any drug offender convicted after August 22, 1996, be-
comes permanently ineligible for food stamps and temporary assistance
to needy families, 50 unless the state of residence opts out.5 1 So far,
twenty-four states have adopted the ban, 52 eighteen have modified it,
53
and eight have opted OUt.5 4 Modifications usually center around tem-
47. See Demleitner, supra note 34, at 158 (discussing impact of denial of social
and welfare rights). Drug possession convictions cap the maximum ineligibility
period at one and five years, respectively. See id.
48. Between 1990 and 2000, about 3,500 federal drug offenders and 2,200
state drug offenders lost some or all of their benefits under the 1988 Program. See
Musser, supra note 46, at 254. Its effect in federal cases is limited since most drug
offenders are released after these restrictions end. See id. at 255.
49. See Demleitner, supra note 34, at 158 (discussing ultimate collateral conse-
quence of permanent termination of all social and welfare benefits for repeat of-
fenders); see also Thomas Hammarberg, Not By Bread Alone ... but Not Without Bread
Either, U.N. CHRONICLE, Jan. 1998 (noting that, under Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, access to food and housing are human rights), available at http://
www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/1998/issue4/498p18p.htm. The International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, of which the United States is not a
signatory, guarantees explicitly the rights to food and housing. See UNITED NA-
TIONS, COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RGHTS, GENERAL COM-
MENT 7; THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING (ART. 11(1) OF THE COVENANT):
FORCED EviCrlONS, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/4 (1997), at wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/gencomm/escgencom7.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001) (discussing
rights to food and housing). Most of the debate surrounding economic rights
focuses on the availability of resources to implement such a right. The United
States, however, does not argue that it does not have the resources to provide ex-
offenders with access to food and housing, but rather that they are not worthy of
such goods.
50. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 862a(a), (b), (d)(2) (2000) (describing increasingly puni-
tive collateral consequences imposed upon drug offenders). The Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families program includes all federal welfare benefits.
51. See 21 U.S.C. § 862a(d) (offering states option of opting out of enforce-
ment of statute).
52. See, e.g., Letter from the Legal Action Center to the Office of Family Assis-
tance, at 8 (Nov. 26, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Legal Action Center
Letter].
53. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 256D.024 (1997) (mandating five-year ban on ben-
efits after completion of sentence unless ex-offender is in drug treatment program,
has successfully completed one or has been determined not to need such treat-
ment). Among the other states modifying the ban on food stamps and temporary
assistance to ex-offenders are Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Washington, and
Wisconsin. See Legal Action Center Letter, supra note 52, at 8.
54. See Legal Action Center Letter, supra note 52, at 8 (noting that the states
opting out of federal ban on food stamps and temporary assistance to ex-offenders
are Connecticut, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Vermont, and District of Columbia).
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poral ineligibility limitations and treatment or recovery as eligibility
grounds. 5
5
Federal housing policies allow for the exclusion of drug offenders
from federally subsidized or funded housing. 56 Drug-related activity alone
may result in eviction from public housing.57 The denial of public hous-
ing, therefore, does not result directly from a drug conviction. However,
in the vast majority of cases, drug-related activity will come to the attention
of housing authorities because of a conviction record. Unless an offender
can demonstrate that she receives treatment, she will be banned from pub-
lic housing. The public housing agency may consider proof of rehabilita-
tion prior to issuing an eviction notice. 58
In many cases, the existence of an illegal drug user in a household
will cause the entire household to be evicted and barred from public hous-
ing.59 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the statute does not allow for
an innocent owner defense. 60 Evictions are ultimately discretionary deci-
sions of housing agencies based on the threat drug activity constitutes. 61
Because private landlords often do not want to rent to ex-offenders,
many of these ex-offenders find themselves on the street unless family
members who do not reside in public housing are able to take them in. 62
This creates a vicious circle for the drug offender. The lack of access to
food and housing makes it frequently impossible for offenders to gain em-
ployment, and the lack of employment prevents access to food and
housing.
B. Restrictions on Employment and Education
Congress and the states have made it more difficult for ex-offenders
to receive education and find employment after a drug conviction. Many
of these provisions may not have been designed to limit an offender's em-
ployability, but rather were passed for punitive reasons. Only some are
based on an assessment of the risk of re-offending. Nevertheless, the ef-
55. The federal legislation is just one example of the increasing use of the
power of the federal purse to get state compliance with restrictive and punitive
federal criminal justice policies. See Travis, supra note 32 (manuscript at 12-13).
56. See 42 U.S.C § 1437(1)(b) (2002); Housing Laws Affecting Individuals with
Criminal Convictions, FACT SHEET (Legal Action Ctr., New York, N.Y. 2000).
57. A conviction for the production of illegal narcotics in federally assisted
housing can lead to eviction and a permanent bar on such housing and any other
federal low-income housing assistance.
58. See TRAviS ET AL., supra note 26, at 35 (discussing exception housing au-
thorities may make to ban on public housing for tenants who can prove that they
are receiving rehabilitation treatment); see also 42 U.S.C. § 13662(b)(2) (2002)(providing that public housing agency or owner may consider whether applicant is
rehabilitated).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d) (1) (6).
60. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230 (2002).
61. See id.
62. See TRAViS ET AL., supra note 26, at 35-36 (discussing difficulties ex-offend-
ers face finding suitable housing when they are released from prison).
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fect on employment is palpable while most of the restrictions are unlikely




Some collateral consequences indirectly affect the employability of
ex-offenders because they make it impossible for them to fulfill basic job
requirements. First, congressional legislation demands the revocation or
suspension of drivers' licenses for at least six months for persons convicted
of drug felonies.6 4 Despite the lack of an apparent connection between
drug felonies and the use of motor vehicles, Congress mandated the loss
of this "privilege" as a punitive sanction.65 A state can avoid the imposi-
tion of this provision without penalty only if the state legislature and gover-
nor jointly express their opposition to the legislation.66 Unexplained non-
compliance will lead to the loss of 10% of the state's highway funding. 6
7
Second, a person convicted of a felony drug offense may not receive
a passport if he had crossed an international boundary or used the pass-
port in committing the offense. 68 An issued passport may be revoked,
even for misdemeanor drug offenses if the government finds that the of-
fense should give rise to such a disqualification. 69 These restrictions are
likely of lesser practical importance. In an increasingly international mar-
ketplace, however, they may limit some employment options available to
an ex-offender.
63. See Petersilia, supra note 39, at 3-4. Ex-offenders often have difficulties
finding employment because employers are reluctant to hire individuals with a
criminal record. See id. (noting that recent surveys indicate that 65% of employers
in five major U.S. cities would not employ ex-offenders). With the wider availabil-
ity and the greater ease of doing background checks, employers are more likely to
screen out such applicants. Only a serious restriction in the labor pool, such as
occurs during times of low unemployment, may cause a short-term change. See id.
For other reasons that limit the employability of ex-offenders, including lack
of skills, race, relocation of jobs, changes in the job market, economic downturns
and competition from welfare leavers, see WILLIAM J. SABOL & JAMES P. LYNCH,
URBAN INST., PRISONER REENTRY IN PERSPECTIVE 18 (2000); TRAviS ET AL., supra note
26, at 31-34.
64. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-388, 106 Stat. 1520 (1992) (providing for revocation
or suspension of driver's licenses).
65. See id.
66. See TRAvis ET AL., supra note 26, at 13 n.44 (discussing procedure states
must follow to avoid negative consequences of their refusal to implement federal
legislation). As of 2001, thirty-three states had expressed their opposition to the
policy while seventeen states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have en-
acted the legislation. See id.
67. See 23 U.S.C. § 159 (2000) (setting out effect on state highway funding
depending on whether states choose compliance or non-compliance).
68. See 22 U.S.C. § 2714(a) (1), (b) (1) (2000) (setting forth criteria for ineligi-
bility and revocation of passports).
69. See 22 U.S.C. § 2714(b) (2) (2000) (discussing misdemeanors).
103720021
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Third, federal legislation impacts a wide variety of other privileges
that affect employment opportunities for all types of felons, including
drug offenders. Among the most important is the ban on the possession
of any firearms upon a felony conviction of a "crime punishable by impris-
onment for a term exceeding one year."70 Since many security jobs re-
quire employees to carry firearms, ex-felons, regardless of the offense
committed or the length of time elapsed since they served their sentence,
are subject to this restriction. 71 In addition to these indirect employment
bars, some jobs are explicitly restricted.
2. Direct Limitations
Felony convictions lead to the automatic revocation of and bar on a
wide variety of federal and state licenses. The denial of state employment
licenses to felons has a long history. 72 Throughout the 1980s many states
restricted the employment opportunities of parolees and ex-offenders
even further, largely to symbolize their sincerity in the "war" on crime.73
California, for example, prohibits parolees from working in real estate,
nursing or physical therapy.7 4 Loss of such licenses means loss of employ-
ment, and in some cases a long-term, if not permanent, bar on re-employ-
ment in a profession in which the offender may have acquired certain
skills and abilities. The same applies to public employment.75
"At least six states... permanently bar ex-offenders from public em-
ployment."76 The effect of such bars is solely punitive where the offense
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000), 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (2000) (noting
that term does not include offenses relating to regulation of businesses).
71. The restrictions may also carry an inverse incentive in the prosecution
and conviction of offenders who carry firearms as part of their present employ-
ment. If alerted to the existence of such restrictions, prosecutors and judges may
adjust charging and conviction practices to protect offenders from the inevitable
loss of employment resulting from a criminal conviction that leads to the denial of
firearms privileges. See Interview with Robert M.A. Johnson, supra note 31.
72. See generally Nora V. Demleitner, Stopping a Vicious Cycle: Release, Restrictions,
Re-Offending, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 243 (2000) (providing overview of difficul-
ties faced by released prisoners, especially difficulties in efforts to obtain
employment).
73. See Petersilia, supra note 39, at 4; Travis, supra note 32 (manuscript at 10)
(discussing intent of states to limit employment opportunities for ex-convicts by
increasing occupational bars).
74. See Petersilia, supra note 39, at 4 (noting irony in state funding for rehabil-
itation of offenders, which includes persuading them to engage in legitimate work,
while denying them such opportunities).
75. For a list of five collateral consequences of felony convictions, including
restrictions on public employment, and whether these rights are restorable, see
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION
1998, at 308-11 tbl.49 [hereinafter STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1998].
76. TRAviS ET AL., supra note 26, at 31 (listing Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, Missis-
sippi, Rhode Island and South Carolina as states that impose permanent bars for
public employment on ex-offenders).
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committed and the risk of recidivism are unconnected to the
employment.
77
Federal restrictions on certain governmental programs and contracts
also impact the employability of ex-offenders directly.7 8 Many of these
bars, even those imposed by regulatory agencies, are virtually automatic.
Drug offenders, especially, will find it difficult to obtain waivers of such
bars and reinstatement of necessary licenses.
79
3. Education
Even more problematic than the denial of specific employment op-
portunities are restrictions on training and education for drug offenders.
Under the 1988 Denial of Federal Benefits Program, convicted drug of-
fenders may be denied access to government benefits, including funds to
finance education and job training, upon conviction.8 0 While the bar is
discretionary and the decision rests with the sentencing judge in cases of
first convictions, it becomes mandatory when the offender faces his third
conviction for drug sales.
8
'
Education grants, loans and work assistance are now being denied
automatically to all those convicted of any drug offense-a felony or mis-
demeanor, trafficking, or simple possession.8 2 The length of such denial
depends on the number and type of convictions. One conviction for drug
possession triggers a one-year denial; two convictions lead to a two-year
ineligibility period; three or more convictions make the ban permanent.
For drug sales, a first conviction means a two-year ban; any subsequent
77. See also KuzmA, supra note 45, at 7 (noting that federal law restricts ability
of ex-offenders to hold certain positions within labor unions or employee benefits
plans). This disability is time limited and may be removed by the sentencing court.
See id.
78. See Demleitner, supra note 34, at 154.
79. See KuzMA, supra note 45, at 5 (noting federal statutes that mandate loss or
ineligibility of employment licenses upon drug conviction).
80. See Musser, supra note 46, at 253-54 (discussing effects of Denial of Federal
Benefits Program on federal benefits of convicted felons).
81. See id. at 256 n.1 (describing sanctions imposed on felons receiving third
and subsequent convictions).
82. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091 (r) (2000) ("A student who has been convicted of any
offense under federal or state law involving the possession or sale of a controlled
substance shall not be eligible to receive any grant, loan, or work assistance ....").
The limitation on federal education funding tracks the congressional elimina-
tion of prison-based higher education programs which occurred in 1994. See Vio-
lent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 20411, 108 Stat. 1796, 1828 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1070a(b) (8)
(1994)) (denying Pell grants to prisoners); see also Fox Butterfield, Tight Budgets
Force States to Reconsider Crime and Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at Al (describ-
ing State of Illinois funding cuts for education in prison beyond high school
equivalency level).
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conviction leads to a permanent denial of aid. Only a showing of drug
rehabilitation can end an indefinite loss.83
Congressional drafters of this legislation envisioned that students con-
victed of drug offenses while receiving federal aid would be deprived of
such financial assistance.84 The ban is currently being enforced, however,
so as to deprive all ex-drug offenders of federal aid, independent of when
their convictions occurred. 85 The denial of aid does not affect individuals
convicted of offenses other than drug crimes.
Lack of an education and of marketable skills combined with the
stigma of a criminal conviction make it difficult for many ex-offenders to
find employment. "One year after release, as many as sixty percent of for-
mer inmates are not employed in the legitimate labor market."8 6 How
much of the difficulty in finding employment can be attributed to collat-
eral sanctions is unclear. However, they effectively close a large number of
employment opportunities, skilled and unskilled, to ex-offenders, and
have made it more difficult for them to get additional skills training.
C. Denial of Political Participation
Among the most highly publicized collateral consequences for all of-
fenders is the denial of political rights, including the franchise and the
right to serve onjuries.8 7 While these are of great symbolic value, the daily
impact of their denial may be more limited, even though long-term or
permanent disenfranchisement is likely to increase alienation from
society.
Forty-eight states deny all prison inmates the right to vote, with most
of them continuing such restriction while the offenders are under the su-
83. See also Musser, supra note 46, at 255 (including drug treatment as one
criterion for reinstatement of federal benefits).
84. See Associated Press, 43,000 Students with Drug Convictions Face Denial of
Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at Al (voicing concern over harsh application of
statute denying financial aid to drug-offending college students).
85. Even though attempts have been made to change the way in which the
legislation has been implemented, so far they have failed, and the government has
continued to use the broadest possible reading of the statute. See Dan Curry, Edu-
cation Department May Relax Provision Denying Student Aid to Those with Drug Convic-
tions, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Sept. 7, 2001, at 34.
86. Petersilia, supra note 39, at 4.
87. See STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1998, supra note 75, at 308-11 tbl.49 (list-
ing collateral consequences associated with felony convictions, including disen-
franchisement and denial of right to serve on juries). The denial of the franchise
has created concern for decades. See, e.g., Nora Demleitner, Continuing Payment on
One's Debt to Society, MINN. L. REv. 753, 766 (2000). The issue, however, became
highly visible upon release of a study demonstrating the disproportionate impact
of disenfranchisement on African-Americans, and later with the 2000 presidential
election. See Petersilia, supra note 39, at 5. The debates about the Florida ballots
included some discussion about the permanent disenfranchisement of all felons in
that state. See Lani Guinier, What We Must Overcome, Am. PROSPECT, Mar. 12, 2001,
at 26 (criticizing Florida's disenfranchisement laws which precluded more than
40,000 disenfranchised ex-felons from voting in presidential elections).
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pervision of the criminal justice system. 88 More than a dozen states, how-
ever, go substantially farther by permanently denying the right to vote to
ex-offenders.8 9 As of 1998, almost four million Americans were perma-
nently deprived of the franchise, with 1.4 million being African-
American. 90
While this restriction applies to all offenders, the war on drugs has led
to the criminal justice system's disproportionate focus on drug offenders.
Therefore, many of those temporarily or permanently deprived of the
right to participate in the polity are drug offenders. The racial make-up of
drug offenders, resulting in part from enforcement strategies, accounts for
an increasing number of African-American men-and women-being
disenfranchised.
Even though legislative and litigation-based efforts are under way to
restore the voting rights of ex-offenders who are no longer under supervi-
sion of the criminal justice system,9 1 so far many of them have remained
unsuccessful. 9 2 While many citizen drug offenders lose their voting rights
upon a drug conviction, non-citizens usually lose their right to stay in the
United States.93
D. Deportation
Some of the most dramatic sanctions that can befall a drug offender
are immigration-related. Non-U.S. citizens are inadmissible if they admit
to having committed or have been convicted of a drug-related offense. 9 4
Federal law also allows the immigration service to deny admission to sus-
pected drug traffickers and their family members, even if they are not
criminally convicted.95
Criminal convictions make non-citizens who are in the United States
removable, even if they hold permanent residency status. Any conviction
of a drug offense, other than possession of thirty grams or less of mari-
juana for one's own use, leads to deportation. 96 Drug users and addicts
88. See STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1998, supra note 75, at 308-11 tbl.49 (out-
lining collateral consequences of felony convictions, including denial of right to
vote, by state).
89. See id.
90. SeeJAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE SENTENC-
ING PROJECT, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (1998) (discussing racial impact of disenfranchisement
laws).
91. See Demleitner, supra note 34, at 162 (discussing restoration of voting
rights to ex-felons); Margie Hyslop, Some Maryland Felons to Get Vote, WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2001.
92. But see Demleitner, supra note 34, at 162 (discussing lack of state willing-
ness to adopt laws to restore voting rights to ex-offenders).
93. See id. (discussing severity of consequences facing aliens with felony drug
convictions).
94. See8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (A), (B) (2000).
95. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (C), (H) (2000).
96. See8 U.S.C. § 1227(2) (B) (i) (2002).
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are also deportable. 97 Since under current law a conviction for drug traf-
ficking constitutes an "aggravated felony," 98 the offender is disqualified
from relief from removal because he cannot establish "good moral charac-
ter."99 Two misdemeanor drug possession convictions will be treated as
"aggravated felonies" which make the non-citizen automatically deport-
able, irrespective of his or her background. 10 0 For new permanent re-
sidents the law is even less forgiving. A single drug possession conviction
can lead to mandatory deportation even if the criminal court assessed only
a probationary sentence. 10 1 Although the 1996 immigration legislation
has not been interpreted to apply retroactively,1 0 2 long-term permanent
resident aliens who have led law-abiding lives for many years following a
minor drug conviction may also be deported to their countries of citizen-
ship. Unless personal, familial or societal considerations weigh in favor of
keeping the ex-offender in the United States, deportation will occur, even
though the ex-offender may have only very limited ties or no connection
to his country of citizenship.
The only possible avenue to avoid deportation is usually through a
pardon. 10 3 Expungement of a drug conviction is insufficient to prevent
deportation. 10 4 Some circuits, however, have deemed expunged convic-
tions under the Federal First Offender Act (FFOA), which applies solely to
first-time drug offenders guilty of simple possession, and similar state pro-
visions not to constitute convictions for purposes of removal proceed-
97. See8 U.S.C. § 1227(2)(B)(ii) (2000).
98. See8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (B) (2000).
99. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314-26 (2000) (describing changes in re-
moval procedures); David Martin, Testimony Before the Ad Hoc Committee on
Irish Affairs Concerning the Deportation and Exclusion of Persons Who May Have
Committed Criminal or Terrorist Attacks (Feb. 6, 1997), available at http://
www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/congress/testimonies/ 1997/970206.pdf.
Deportation of drug offenders carries foreign policy consequences for the
United States. Many countries are unwilling or at least reluctant to take back their
citizens, in part because they fear that the ex-offenders establish drug routes be-
tween their countries and the United States, and in part because they do not con-
sider these ex-offenders their responsibility. To prevent the commission of crime
by these uprooted deportees, the receiving countries must engage in extensive and
broad-ranging efforts, which are often costly, to integrate them.
100. For a critique of the "aggravated felony" classification, see Nancy
Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Law and the Limited Scope
of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939-41 (2000).
101. See id. at 1941.
102. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326.
103. See CARL F. HOROWITZ, AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICYAND
SERIOUS CRIME (2001), available at www.cis.org/articles/2001/crime/release.html.
Drug offenders are statutorily precluded from naturalizing. Therefore, the avenue
by which deportation could be prevented is not open to them.
104. See, e.g., Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771 (2001); In re Roldan-
Santoyo, No. A90 286 629, 1999 WL 126433 (BIA Mar. 3,1999); see also Nathalie A.
Bleuz(, Casenote, Matter of Roldan: Expungement of Conviction and the Role of States
in Immigration Matters, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 817 (2001).
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ings.10 5 One federal court of appeals has held that foreign expungement
of such convictions should be treated identically with FFFOA
expungements.,
06
The war on drugs has caused the incarceration of thousands of non-
citizens. Some studies indicate that non-citizens are "disproportionately
incarcerated for drug-related crimes." 10 7 In federal court, non-citizens
constituted almost one-third of all drug offenders, but only one-tenth of
all other offenders. 10 8 Therefore, collateral consequences of drug convic-
tions and the excesses of the war on drugs disproportionately impact non-
citizens. Deportation is one of the harshest collateral sanctions because
the ex-offender loses his or her right to stay in the United States and is
precluded from re-entering for decades. 10 9
E. Family Life
Other collateral consequences impact select offender populations,
such as offenders who are parents. More than one-half of male and two-
thirds of female prisoners are parents of minor children. 110 The denial of
welfare benefits, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), presents particular problems for ex-offenders with children. For
many of them their inability to access food stamps and public housing
makes it either impossible to reunite with their children or prevents them
from creating a suitable living environment. 1 1 The latter leads to educa-
tional difficulties for the children, lack of parental supervision and even
maltreatment. 1 2 Although these collateral consequences have negative
effects on the family lives of men and women, women-mothers-may be
105. See Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2000).
106. See Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d 996, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[Eliqual pro-
tection bars the government from discriminating against aliens who have commit-
ted substantially identical offenses and have had their convictions expunged under
substantially identical statutes, solely because of where the offense occurred.").
107. See HOROWITZ, supra note 103, at www.cis.org/articles/2001/crime/re-
lease.html; see also Morawetz, supra note 100, at 1945-46.
108. See Stephen Demuth, The Effect of Citizenship Status on Sentencing Outcomes
in Drug Cases, 14 FED. SENTENCING REP. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript on file
with author) (discussing effect of citizenship status on sentencing decisions).
Despite the dramatic effect of a drug conviction, some courts have held that
failure to inform the defendant of the likelihood of his or her deportation does
not invalidate a plea agreement. United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 517
n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that "there is no due process requirement for defend-
ants to be informed of immigration consequences because immigration conse-
quences are collateral") (emphasis added).
109. See8 U.S.C. § 1182(9) (A) (2002).
110. See Petersilia, supra note 39, at 4 (discussing negative impact of collateral
consequences on family unit).
111. PATRICIA ALLARD, LIFE SENTENCES: DENYING WELFARE BENEFITS TO WOMEN
CONVICTED OF DRUG OFFENSES 8, 10-12 (2002).
112. See id. at 13-14.
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disproportionately impacted.1 13 Because of the enforcement strategies
used in the war on drugs, Latina and African-American women and their
families in particular are the victims of the lifetime welfare ban.' 
14
For parents, legislation designed to prevent children from staying in
foster care long-term also has a dramatic impact.' 15 Such adoption/foster
care legislation allows for the termination of parental rights once children
spend fifteen of the last twenty-two months in foster care. 116 Therefore,
long-term incarceration during which the offender is not able to place her
children with relatives or friends can cause her to lose access to her chil-
dren permanently unless she can show a "compelling reason" not to termi-
nate her parental rights. 117 Since the average female drug offender serves
eighteen months in prison, upon her release she may be denied the right
to reunite with her family.1 18 The aim of the legislation was to make chil-
dren more quickly available for adoption, and thus, to provide a stable
family environment for them.1 19 However, it has a detrimental impact on
those drug offenders who would be willing and able to provide for their
children except for their incarceration. Parents often consider the termi-
nation of their parental rights an additional sanction.
120
Ex-drug offenders are also unable to become foster parents if they
were convicted of a drug felony within the last five years. 12 1 The only ex-
113. See id. (focusing on women convicted of drug offenses). Detailing the
impact of collateral consequences on female offenders and their children may be
an effective strategy to garner public attention and bring about legislative changes.
Male offenders generally, and male drug offenders in particular, do not tend to
engender sympathy.
114. See id. at 6-7 tbl. 3.
115. See Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Lanett P. Dalley,
Imprisoned Mothers and Their Children: Their Often Conflicting Legal Rights, 22 HAMLINE
J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 20 (2000) (characterizing legislative grounds for termination
of parental rights as too constricting).
Having an incarcerated parent creates substantial problems for children. See
Petersilia, supra note 39, at 4. Although little is known regarding the specific ef-
fects on children, collateral consequences encountered by parents-such as diffi-
culty finding housing, employment or childcare-are likely to have a "significant"
effect on their children. See id.; see also Note, Winning the War, supra note 17, at
1490. It is unclear whether adoption ameliorates or aggravates this situation.
116. See Dalley, supra note 115, at 19-22 (discussing criteria that lead to termi-
nation of parental rights).
117. See id. at 25 (discussing likelihood of termination of parental rights due
to incarcerated mother's legal and physical situation).
118. See Travis, supra note 32 (manuscript at 40) (discussing length of jail
term of female drug offenders in relation to loss of paternal rights).
119. See Dalley, supra note 115, at 31 (weighing parental rights against child's
best interests).
120. See Erica D. Benites, Comment, In Defense of the Family: An Argument for
Maintaining the Parental Rights of Incarcerated Women in Texas, 3 THE SCHOLAR: ST.
MARY'S LAw REviEw ON MINORITV ISSUES 193, 197 (2001).
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (20) (A) (ii) (2001) (denying foster care for person
convicted of felony drug offense within past five years).
[Vol. 47: p. 10271044
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss4/11
COLLATERAL DAMAGE
ception applies when the restriction would impose exceptional hardship
under the best interest of the child standard.1 22
The adoption/foster care legislation does not fall into the same cate-
gory as the other collateral consequences discussed. Its goal lies outside
the criminal justice system and, thus, does not aim to punish or deter ex-
offenders. Nevertheless, its impact on drug offenders cannot be overesti-
mated in light of the growing number of incarcerated women (and men),
many of whom are single parents.' 23
While studies documenting the effect of disenfranchisement on ex-
offenders, for example, are virtually non-existent, recent re-entry related
work indicates that family constitutes the most important element for suc-
cessful reintegration. 124 Most of the incarcerated women expect to live
with their children upon release, 125 and that expectation gives many of
them the necessary incentive to start a law-abiding life. 126 Being deprived
of such a powerful incentive leads to resignation and fatalism, precursors
of a return to crime.
F. Restoration of Rights
Collateral consequences become inapplicable when an offender's
civil rights are restored. In a minority of states, all rights of ex-offenders
are restored automatically at the end of incarceration or when the maxi-
mum sentence has expired. 12 7 In other states, ex-felons have access to an
administrative procedure for restoring all or some of their rights.' 2 8 The
restoration of rights may occur through the sealing of records or through
statements of rehabilitation. 129 Certificates of rehabilitation remove auto-
matic disqualifications for certain jobs even though they do not erase the
conviction. Sealed records, on the other hand, are not accessible to most
employers. 130 The final group of states allows restoration only through
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a) (15) (A) (2001) (calling child's best interest "para-
mount concern" of legislation).
123. See Petersilia, supra note 39, at 4 (noting that currently 7% of prison
population consists of women, with number rising).
124. See id. (noting importance of family in reintegration).
125. See id. (discussing expectations of mothers to resume relationships with
children post-incarceration).
126. See Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder, Severing Family Ties: The Plight of Non-
violent Female Offenders and Their Children, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 133, 135 (1999).
127. See Demleitner, supra note 34, at 155.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 162; see also Note, Winning the War, supra note 17, at 1494-95
(noting that "Second Chance" proposal would allow for sealing of records of non-
violent drug offenders if such offenders complete individual rehabilitation plan
and stay in program for five years).
130. See Note, Winning the War, supra note 129, at 1495 (noting that only crim-
inal justice and law enforcement officials have access to sealed records).
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gubernatorial action.' 3 ' Governors, however, are frequently reluctant to
pardon ex-offenders. 13 2
In the federal system, a presidential pardon restores the federal rights
lost upon a conviction. 133 No statutory provision, however, governs the
restoration of state rights for federal felons. Since most rights are lost be-
cause of state law provisions, federal ex-offenders are often denied certain
rights forever since neither federal nor state law provides a remedy. 134
Administrative agencies may grant relief from conviction-based disa-
bilities, including deportation and the ban on military enlistment. 13 5 The
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) is authorized to restore
federal firearms privileges;' 3 6 no funds, however, have been allocated to
this program.13 7 Currently, the Supreme Court has a case under review in
which the Fifth Circuit ruled that congressional failure to provide funding
does not suspend the provision of the Act under which the ATF can pro-
vide relief. The Court will have to decide whether, under the circum-
stances, district courts may remove firearms disabilities.1 38
Many collateral consequences tied specifically to drug offenses no
longer apply once the offender receives drug treatment or has been reha-
bilitated. However, funding for treatment inside and out of prison has
declined dramatically over the last decade. 13 9 Therefore, very few drug
131. See Demleitner, supra note 34, at 155 (discussing how this approach does
not always ensure felon's "political" rights).
132. See, e.g., Sam Cardinale, Workshop Helps Restore Rights, LEDGER (Lakeland,
Fla.),Jan. 27, 2002, at B3 (noting that fewer than 1,000 ex-felons had their voting
rights restored in Florida in 2000 after applying to Governor's Office of Executive
Clemency); William Glaberson, State's Pardons Now Looked At in Starker Light, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 16, 2001, at Al (discussing reluctance of some governors to issue
pardons).
133. See KuzmA, supra note 45, at 13 (noting that among these rights are right
to vote, right to serve on jury and right to hold public office); Margaret Love, Fear
of Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the Theory and Practice of Pardoning, 13 FED. SEN-
TENCING REP. 125, 125 (2001).
134. See KUZMA, supra note 45, at 14 (noting need for program because resto-
ration of rights of ex-felons is matter of state law).
135. See id. at 15 (discussing relief granted by various administrative agencies).
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a) (33) (B) (ii) (2000) (restoring firearm rights of con-
victed felons).
137. See KUZMA, supra note 45, at 19-23 (noting that restoration of firearms
privileges has been confusing and heavily litigated).
138. See Bean v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 253 F.3d 234 (5th
Cir. 2001), cert. granted, Bean v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 917 (Jan. 22, 2002) (No.
01-704).
139. See Petersilia, supra note 39, at 2 (noting that in-prison substance abuse
programs lack participation incentives and are only minimally available). Only
13% of the seventy to eighty-five percent of state prisoners who need treatment for
substance abuse receive it while imprisoned. See id. Similarly, only a small percent-
age of offenders receive drug treatment while on probation. See Belenko, supra
note 40, at 837; ALLARD, supra note 111, at 21-24 (highlighting difficulties for low-
income women in receiving drug treatment).
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offenders are able to avoid the collateral consequences associated with
drug convictions.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF "COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES"
The denial of economic, social and political benefits and rights at best
delays the reintegration of ex-drug offenders into society. At worst, it leads
them back to prison. The difficulties these' ex-offenders face also affect
their families and communities negatively, often because they create
greater instability, anomie and ultimately higher crime rates.
A. Criminal Sanctions
Any violation of the post-conviction restrictions imposed on drug of-
fenders constitutes a criminal offense. The State of Virginia, for example,
prosecuted convicted felons for voting in state elections. 140 The United
States government will prosecute any Pell grant applicant who untruthfully
answers the question whether he or she has ever been convicted of a drug
offense.' 4 1 The violation of collateral consequences has the most dra-
matic impact on convicted felons who "possess a firearm" and non-citizens
deported for a criminal offense who re-enter the United States.142
Deportations based on convictions for criminal offenses lead to re-
entry bars of ten to twenty years.' 4 3 For offenders with deep ties in the
United States or those whose families are unable to move with them to
their country of citizenship, such long-term separation is very difficult to
endure. Because penalties for illegal re-entry after conviction are severe, a
substantial number of immigration violations consist of felonious re-
entry. 1
4 4
The severity of the re-entry bar is partly responsible for the high recid-
ivism rate. Other violations of collateral consequences may be due to their
relative obscurity or difficulties in interpretation. The interplay of federal
140. SeeVA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-1004 (Michie 2001) (providing that all unquali-
fied persons who vote shall be guilty of "Class 1 Misdemeanor").
141. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070a et. seq. (2000) (setting forth federal Pell Grant
regulations).
142. See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATT'Y, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILI-
TIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 14-18 (1996) (discussing loss
of federal firearms privileges for felons); 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2002) (setting penalties
for re-entry of removed aliens).
143. See8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1) (2000) (establishing maximum sentence often
years if removal from United States followed "a conviction for commission of three
or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both, or a
felony (other than an aggravated felony)"); 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2) (establishing
maximum of twenty years when removal followed "a conviction for commission of
an aggravated felony").
144. In 1997, of about 16,000 convictions for immigration and nationality of-
fenses, almost 2,680 consisted of re-entries of deported non-citizens. The only
larger category was made up of aliens who entered illegally (approximately 6,330).
See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE 195 tbl.72 (1999).
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and state provisions enhances the danger of criminal prosecutions. Fre-
quently, state offenders are not being alerted to federal restrictions, such
as the right to carry firearms, and federal offenders do not know about
state limitations on many aspects of their lives. Therefore, violations of
collateral consequences are often triggered by ignorance or desperation.
B. Recidivism, Destruction of Families and Anomie
Civil sanctions turn all offenders, especially poor, female and minority
offenders, their families and their communities, into "collateral damage.
For drug offenders, collateral consequences come on top of already long
prison sentences and often amount to a virtual life sentence. These re-
strictions frequently lead to re-offending and ultimately re-imprisonment.
Arguments of "user accountability" and deterrence traditionally sup-
ported collateral consequences. They, nevertheless, impact predomi-
nantly the worst off by denying them assistance upon release from prison
and creating significant obstacles to their reintegration.
The denial of basic rights affects not only the offender and her family,
but also her community. Many communities to which drug offenders re-
turn suffer disproportionately from lack of cohesion, unemployment,
homelessness and family instability. 145 By increasing the number of obsta-
cles facing ex-offenders, their chances of succeeding in this environment
are further reduced, with detrimental consequences for these
communities. '
46
In light of the dramatic effects of the war on drugs, which have been
aggravated by collateral sanctions, what can be done? How can we de-
crease the crime rate while re-integrating those that have become the casu-
alties of the war on drugs?
IV. A "MARSHALL PLAN"
Neither the mere abolition of collateral consequences nor a narrow
approach to re-entry of offenders will resolve the problems surrounding
the annual release of thousands of inmates. What is called for instead is a
visionary, Marshall Plan-like approach that will address our national inter-
ests in societal stability and reduced crime after a devastating "war."
145. See Petersilia, supra note 39, at 3 (discussing adverse impact returning
drug offenders have on community); see also SABOL & LYNCH, supra note 63, at 19-
20 (noting access to jobs and services is limited in re-entry communities).
146. See Petersilia, supra note 39, at 3 (describing studies which indicate that
inmates returning to their communities from prison increase community crime
rates, and thus, have a destabilizing effect on such neighborhoods); see also LaFree
et al., supra note 28, at 25-26 (indicating impact of returning offenders and their
reincarceration upon communities).
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A. The Marshall Plan
After the defeat of the Axis powers, the Allies occupied Germany. Be-
cause of increasing disagreements among the Allies, a growing Commu-
nist threat and the increasing restlessness of the German population,
Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed a plan to restore Eu-
rope. 14 7 Its goal was to create a stable and prosperous Europe.148 In his
speech, Marshall noted that an economic future was crucial to prevent
disturbances by desperate people. 149
Two crucial elements relevant to the reintegration of drug offenders
contributed to the development of the Marshall Plan. First, in the late
1940s, the United States and Great Britain perceived the need for an eco-
nomically and politically strong Germany in order to remedy economic
problems arising from occupation and to contain the threat of Commu-
nism. 150 The interest in rebuilding Germany was based partly on self-in-
terest, including the goal of lessening the heavy tax burden the
occupation caused, 151 and partly on the desire to assure peace and stabil-
ity. 15 2 Second, and perhaps surprisingly, the United States did not con-
sider the German population unredeemable even after the extent of Nazi
atrocities in the Holocaust became public. It punished those who had par-
ticipated in war crimes and crimes against humanity,' 53 and those who
had supported the Nazi government. Subsequently, however, it provided
the initial funds for the rebuilding of Europe through the Marshall Plan.
The Plan was so successful that Europe has become an economic power-
house second only to the United States. Japan, another major economic
power today, also benefited from U.S. assistance after its defeat.
A Marshall-type plan has also been proposed for the rebuilding of
Afghanistan following U.S. attacks on that country and the collapse of the
Taliban regime and, on a larger scale, for the entire developing world. It
147. See Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Address at the Commence-
ment Exercises of Harvard University (June 5, 1947), reprinted in CHARLES L. MEE,
JR., THE MARSHALL PLAN: THE LAUNCHING OF THE PAX AMERICANA app. 2, at 271-73
(1984). In a recent speech President Bush explicitly compared his plan for the
rebuilding of Afghanistan to the Marshall Plan. True peace, he argued, can only
be guaranteed once a stable government and a viable economic infrastructure ex-
ist. SeeJames Dao, Bush Sets Role of US in Afghan Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2002, at Al.
148. SeeJOHN GIMBEL, THE ORIGINS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN 1 (1976) (describ-
ing multiple goals of Marshall Plan).
149. See Marshall, supra note 147, at 273.
150. See GIMBEL, supra note 148, at 6, 140.
151. See Marshall, supra note 147, at 272.
152. See GIMBEL, supra note 148, at 195-96.
153. See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 79
(Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1992) (discussing Nuremberg indictments). The Nurem-
berg trials and those trials held subsequently in Germany prosecuted offenders for
war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against piece. See id. The out-
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is based on the same concepts as the original plan, not charity but "a frank
recognition that like peace, prosperity [is] indivisible; that to be sustained
it [must] be shared; and that to achieve this goal require[s] a new public
purpose and international cooperation on a massive scale."1 54
Only an equally broad-based and forward looking plan can counter
the destructive policies of the war on drugs that have made it impossible
for ex-offenders to re-enter society successfully.
B. A Marshall Plan At Home
Why have incarcerative sentences and collateral consequences for
drug offenders increased over the last decade? Largely punitive goals have
animated legislative changes: Drug offenders should not be allowed to
take advantage of the welfare system but instead made to feel the impact
of their actions. A loosening of restrictions seems impossible, largely be-
cause the "goals" of the war on drugs-however unclearly defined-have
not been realized. This is the wrong approach, however. While the "war"
may not be over, "collateral damage" must be addressed, not in the least to
prevent further alienation of those negatively impacted by the "war."
Those who have served their sentences must be reintegrated to minimize
the overall loss of human capital.
In contrast to the view of Germany after World War II, the war on
drugs seems premised on the assumption that drug offenders are expend-
able. While the United States needed a strong Western Europe for eco-
nomic and political reasons, the reintegration of ex-drug offenders is
treated as if it were societally irrelevant. The punishment of Germany en-
ded with the trials of those responsible for the war and the atrocities com-
mitted by the Nazis, the imposition of large reparation payments and the
creation of a democratic Germany. The punishment of drug offenders
through civil sanctions, however, continues long after they have. served the
sentence imposed by the criminal justice system.
No country can afford to write off a large number of its population-
and large the number has become in the last two decades. 155 Restrictions
on the reintegration chances of offenders negatively impact not only the
offenders themselves, but also affect their families and communities, and
ultimately society. The consequences of unemployment, homelessness
and lack of education will be family instability and disintegration, an in-
crease in crime and the virtual collapse of entire communities consisting
154. Gordon Brown, Address to the New York Federal Reserve (Nov. 16,
2001), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/Newsroom and_Speeches/
Press/2001/press_126_01.cfm? (last visited Apr. 17, 2002); Gordon Brown, Ad-
dress to the Washington Press Club (Dec. 17, 2001), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/Newsroom-and-Speeches/Press/2001 /press_1 4601.cfm? (last
visited Apr. 17, 2002); see also Dao, supra note 147 (outlining President Bush's
"Marshall Plan" for rebuilding of Afghanistan).
155. See SABOL & LYNCH, supra note 63, at 9 (noting, that in 1998, of 561,000
offenders released from prison, almost one-third were drug offenders).
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of individuals who are being denied economic recovery and political par-
ticipation. 156 Those consequences are similar to developments Secretary
of State Marshall envisioned would occur without his assistance plan.
For those reasons, the prevailing attitude towards ex-offenders is
shortsighted. To create a safer society and prevent the vicious cycle of re-
offending and re-incarceration, drug offenders must be reintegrated suc-
cessfully. The Marshall Plan, with its ultimately successful integration of
Germany into the group of constitutional democracies, can serve as a
model.
Despite the devastation caused by the Nazi government, the United
States did not consider Germany's population, including those who sup-
ported the Third Reich, unredeemable. Only that attitude could havejus-
tified the financial support provided to the rebuilding of Germany at that
time. There is no reason to view drug offenders who have served their
sentences differently. After having been sanctioned by the official system,
they should be able to count on the solidarity of their fellow members of
society, as symbolized through our welfare system. 157 Perceptions of de-
serving and undeserving have driven much of the development of welfare
law in this country. Nevertheless, in the 1996 overhaul of welfare legisla-
tion, Congress recognized that the neediest require some material support
to become self-reliant-the ultimate goal of any welfare system. The puni-
tive denial of even such limited support presumes, however, that society
does not have any responsibility for those who once offended against it. 158
Such an assumption violates basic human rights norms, important on
the international plane. The war on drugs has given the United States a
negative image abroad, largely because of its disproportionate impact on
African-Americans.15 9 The denial of basic necessities of life, including
housing and food, and disenfranchisement would contribute to this por-
trayal. So far, only the secrecy in which collateral consequences are
shrouded has prevented the United States from being marked a human
rights violator because many of its citizens lack rights that other countries
156. See Petersilia, supra note 39, at 3 (noting increase in crime where poverty
and social instability exists).
157. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (providing public assistance benefits to quali-
fied individuals). Even after the cuts in the 1996 welfare legislation, the federal
government promises some, albeit limited, support for those individuals who have
fallen on hard times and need governmental support payments. See Candice
Hoke, State Discretion Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality, and a
Federalism-Based Constitutional Challenge, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 115, 116-18 (1998)
(outlining benefits provided under Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act of 1996).
158. See Cynthia Godsoe, Note, The Ban on Welfare for Felony Drug Offenders:
Giving a New Meaning to "Life Sentence", 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 257, 257 (1998)
(lamenting that federal welfare law's lifetime ban on benefits to anyone convicted
of drug-related felonies disproportionately impacts women of color).
159. See generally Note, Winning the War, supra note 17 (describing impact of
war on drugs on African-Americans).
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consider basic. 160 These necessities of life should not be reserved only for
the deserving, but should be available for all members of the community
who need them.' 61
In this environment a Marshall Plan is crucial. It should encompass a
number of elements to help convicted offenders rebuild their lives, and
assist us in rebuilding our communities and society. Collateral conse-
quences that deny ex-offenders the tools necessary to be re-integrated suc-
cessfully should be ended.162 On human rights and crime-prevention
grounds, welfare benefits, drug treatment and educational assistance,
which are most important upon release, should be available to all ex-of-
fenders. Without this assistance, the chances for successful reintegration
seem minimal. For the same reasons, drug offenders should be provided
with the possibility of re-uniting with their family and especially with mi-
nor children. Automatic disenfranchisement should be abolished because
it denies ex-offenders the right to participate in the political process. 163
Deportation should again become discretionary to allow for the considera-
tion of the offender's rehabilitation efforts and family and community ties.
Ex-offenders should not be treated better than the rest of the population
but should receive equal treatment.
Certain rights of ex-offenders, such as full access to the labor market,
can be restricted but only after an individualized risk assessment. 164 Reha-
bilitation and lack of danger to the community should be important fac-
tors in opening employment to ex-offenders. The denial of rights should
be reviewed regularly and kept relatively short-lived for most offenders.165
Certain professions, such as nursing and pharmacy jobs, in which ex-of-
fenders would have access to narcotics, may be closed to drug offenders
160. See Demleitner, supra note 34, at 153 (noting society's general lack of
interest in collateral consequences associated with current sentencing regime).
161. See Godsoe, supra note 158, at 257.
162. See TRAvis ET AL., supra note 26, at 46 (asking for reassessment of network
of collateral sanctions to prevent it from creating barriers to reintegration).
163. See Demleitner, supra note 87, at 804 (proposing ways to restrict
disenfranchisement).
164. See Travis, supra note 32 (manuscript at 23); ABA Task Force, supra note
3, at 9 (discussing factors for assessing administrative disqualifications).
Some courts have struck down employment bars as unconstitutional when
they constituted total bans based solely on a prior conviction. See, e.g., Davis v.
Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding City of Philadelphia hiring
policy that prohibited employment of former drug users unconstitutional); Nixon
v. Commonwealth, 189 A.2d 376, 382 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (holding law barring
ex-drug offenders, among others, from working at nursing homes unconstitutional
since it makes no exceptions for rehabilitated ex-offenders); see also Mixon v. Com-
monwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451-52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (striking down dis-
franchisement of ex-offenders for five years following their release from
incarceration).
165. See Demleitner, supra note 34, at 156-58. Some commentators go even
further and demand that so-called collateral sanctions be imposed by the judge at
sentencing, to underscore that they are part of the sentencing process. See generally
ABA Task Force, supra note 3.
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unless they can show successful drug rehabilitation. In those cases, how-
ever, drug convictions would trigger a risk assessment rather than an auto-
matic and permanent bar. Such risk assessment can also be viewed as a
gradual reward scheme. Every step toward rehabilitation will be rewarded
with greater access to the labor market.
In all the above respects, the "Marshall Plan for Drug Offenders" re-
sembles the original Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was based on the
reduction of barriers for German economic recovery through America's
substantial financial and logistical support in the country's rebuilding.
The post-war reconstruction of Germany focused on long-term
changes. 166 The contrast between a "war," which requires quick and con-
centrated action, and rebuilding of a society, which needs multiple, long-
term approaches, is starkest at this point.
16 7
Germany was bound into an economic, political and military alliance
that allowed it to become a fully independent and economically successful
nation. However, its independence and economic success developed
slowly and under the constant supervision and with the assistance of the
Western Allies. A similar model should be followed with regard to drug
offenders.
The present re-entry partnerships funded by Congress and the pro-
posed Offender Reentry and Community Safety Act1 68 both focus on man-
aging the risk released offenders pose to the community by enhancing
their supervision and providing them with support. The first step toward
such a two-prong approach is in the abolition of collateral consequences
that undermine the "Marshall Plan for Drug Offenders."
V. CONCLUSION
Incarcerated offenders would benefit from a discharge plan, akin to
the one established for those in need of care who are released from hospi-
tals or mental institutions. 16 9 Despite differences between the two groups,
a detailed plan guarantees stability, assures the patient as to what to expect
and provides for ongoing care and support. Most importantly, just as pa-
tients are not released with additional, secretly imposed disabilities, we
should not saddle ex-offenders-who already suffer from the stigma of a
166. See SALLIE PIANI, THE CIA AND THE MARSHALL PLAN 36 (1991).
167. See Richard S. Gebelein, The Rebirth of Rehabilitation: Promise and Perils of
Drug Courts, in, SENTENCING & CoRRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21sT CENTURY 6 (U.S.
Dep't of Justice ed., May 2000).
168. See S. 194, 107th Cong. (2001).
169. See, e.g., LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health
Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Il Offenders, 24 SEAT-
TEE U.L. REv. 373, 419-21 (2000); see also Demleitner, supra note 72, at 246 (discuss-
ing suggestions of recent study by Vera Institute of Justice).
18 U.S.C. § 3624 mandates that prisoners who are about to be released from
imprisonment spend a maximum of six months under conditions that will allow
them to adjust to re-entry.
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criminal record-with additional disabilities that make successful integra-
tion and re-entry a virtual mirage. Instead it is time to remedy the drug
war's "collateral damage" and begin rebuilding.
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